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I. INTRODUCTION
Once a consumer" purchases a particular product, he may suffer a variety
of losses resulting from some defect in the product, including personal injury,
injury to the product itself or some other property, and pure economic loss.2 A
consumer can sustain multiple types of harms and his theory of recovery is
1. In this Comment, the term "consumer" refers to both commercial buyers
and ordinary consumers. Although a good argument can be made that it is fair to hold
commercial buyers to the strict requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code be-
cause these types of buyers have equal bargaining power with the seller or manufac-
turer, the same argument cannot plausibly be made in the case of ordinary consumers.
As distinguished from the commercial buyer, the ordinary consumer is that person who
is powerless to protect himself "from insidious contractual provisions such as disclaim-
ers, foisted upon him by commercial enterprises whose bargaining power he is seldom
able to match." Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 27, 403 P.2d 145, 157, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 29 (1965) (en banc) (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting). The term "ordi-
nary consumer" encompasses the general consuming public, i.e., the housewife who
buys a refrigerator, the student who buys a car, or the homeowner who buys carpeting
for his home. This distinction is particularly relevant to a plaintiff's recovery under a
strict tort liability theory.
2. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 95, at 678 (5th ed. 1984); G. WALLACH, THE LAW OF SALES
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11.04(3), at 11-14 to 11-15 (1st ed.
1981); Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defec-
tive Product Cases, 18 STAN, L. REV. 974, 981-82 (1966).
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dependent upon the category into which a given loss falls. A majority of juris-
dictions, including Missouri, recognize three theories of recovery in these
cases: breach of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),3 neg-
ligence in tort,4 or strict liability in tort.5 A critical problem arises, however,
where the consumer has sustained no personal injury, where there has been no
accident, and where there has been no physical injury to other property or
violent injury to the product itself. In effect, the consumer has suffered pure
economic loss.
Economic losses are those losses directly connected with the product pur-
chased which arise when the product does not conform to its expected level of
performance.6 A plaintiff may suffer a loss either from the diminution in the
value of the product itself or from some other loss resulting from the product's
poor performance. The first type of loss is classified as direct and the latter as
indirect or consequential. Direct economic losses encompass loss of bargain,
out-of-pocket expenses, or cost of replacement or repair.7 Loss of bargain is
measured by the difference between "the value of the product as received and
its value as represented."8 Out-of-pocket expenses are measured by "the differ-
3. Express warranties are governed by Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.2-313 (1978).
An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is governed by Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 400.2-315 (1978), whereas the implied warranty of merchantability provisions are set
forth in Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.2-314 (1978); see also Larry Goad & Co. v. Lordstown
Rubber Co., 560 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (purchaser of defective rubber allowed
to recover under an implied warranty of merchantability theory).
4. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050,
1053 (1916) ("We are dealing now with the liability of the manufacturer of the fin-
ished product, who puts it on the market to be used without inspection by his custom-
ers. If he is negligent, where danger is foreseen, a liability will follow."); see also Mc-
Leod v. Linse Air Prod. Co., I S.W.2d 122, 126 (Mo. 1927) (plaintiff recovered for
personal injuries under a negligence theory).
5. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963) (manufacturer strictly liable in tort for physical harm to
persons and tangible property); accord Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d
362 (Mo. 1969) (Missouri judicially adopts strict liability in tort under the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)). 0
6. Cf. Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo. 1978) (en banc)("However, where mere deterioration or loss of bargain is claimed, the concern is with
a failure to meet some standard of quality."); see also Note, Manufacturers' Liability
to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 539, 541 (1966). An example of an economic loss arising because the product
did not work for the general purpose for which it was sold can be found in Larry Goad
& Co. v. Lordstown Rubber Co., 560 F. Supp. 583, 585 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (rubber
purchased for use in lining tanks found to be of questionable quality and later rejected
as unacceptable).
7. Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 917, 918 (1966).
8. Comment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in Products
Liability: An Injury in Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 145, 155 n.39(1972); see also Note, Manufaturers' Strict Tort Liability to Consumers for Eco-
nomic Loss, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 401, 405 (1967).
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ence in value between the purchase price of the product and its value as re-
ceived."" Direct economic losses also include any costs incurred for repair
and/or replacement of the defective product. 10 By contrast, indirect economic
loss is characterized as consequential or an expectation loss. 1 Examples of the
types of indirect economic losses a plaintiff may suffer include losses from fu-
ture business opportunities (i.e., lost profits and wages) and losses due to in-
ability to replace the product. 2
This Comment will focus on the remedies that are available to the con-
sumer who suffers an economic loss. It will explore the three available theories
of recovery and explain why a plaintiff may be precluded from recovery under
one theory but not another. Moreover, it will discuss policy reasons behind
such distinctions. It will address how most jurisdictions have handled this issue
and review decisions of those jurisdictions that appear willing to make all
three theories available to the economically injured plaintiff. Finally, it will
analyze how Missouri courts are applying these theories in economic loss
cases.
Generally, the jurisdictions split into two primary contingents. One group,
undoubtedly the clear majority, refuses to extend tort recovery principles to a
purely economic loss. Consequently, a plaintiff must pursue a cause of action
under a warranty theory. Such actions will be referred to as "Seely"-type
cases.1 3 A very limited number of courts allow consumers, or any other plain-
tiffs, to recover under tort principles. These actions will be referred to as
9. Comment, supra note 8, at 155 n.39.
10. Id. at 155.
11. Under Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.2-715(2) (1978), consequential damages
include:
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs
of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of
warranty.
12. See R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 821 (8th
Cir. 1983) (portion of glass panels purchased by commercial buyer could not be re-
placed since manfacturer stopped producing panels of same color); Travelers Indemnity
Co. v. Evans Pipe Co., 432 F.2d 211, 212 (6th Cir. 1970) (loss of profits suffered when
purchaser of a plastic pipe for use in an irrigation system on a golf course proved
unsatisfactory and required replacement); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 13,
403 P.2d 145, 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 20 (1965) (en banc) (economic losses suffered by
purchaser of truck included lost wages and profits); Clark v. Int'l Harvester Co., 99
Idaho 326, -, 581 P.2d 784, 788 (1978) (loss of profits when tractor manufactured
by defendant produced inadequate horsepower caused by defective clutch); see also W.
KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, supra note 2, at 678; Comment, supra
note 8, at 155; Note, supra note 8, at 405.
13. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 15, 403 P.2d 145, 148, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 21 (1965) (en banc) (where commercial losses are involved, plaintiff must
pursue his cause of action under the Uniform Commercial Code; doctrine of strict lia-
bility in tort designed to govern physical injuries only).
1985]
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"Santor"-type cases.14
Missouri does not clearly follow either approach. Until 1981, Missouri
followed the Seely approach. However, a 1981 Missouri case recognized a
plaintiff's right to recover for pure economic loss under a negligence theory. 15
Confusion arises because the post-1981 cases have maintained the pure Seely
view, apparently refusing to follow the intervening case.16 However, it is undis-
puted that Missouri has refused to extend recovery under a strict tort liability
theory.17 Thus, Missouri courts have chosen not to follow the Santor jurisdic-
tions. On the other hand, if Missouri does in fact recognize a negligence cause
of action for pure economic loss, then it may be only a matter of time before
the courts allow recovery under a strict tort liability theory.
II. BREACH OF WARRANTY UNDER THE UCC
As early as 1603, courts espoused the notion of caveat emptor.18 In es-
sence, after purchase, the consumer was held to assume any and all risks in
the absence of either fraud, intentional deception, or an expressed assumption
by the seller. After decades of considerable public outcry, breach of warranty
liability was born. The breach of warranty theory originally sounded in tort
14. See Santor v. A.& M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 66, 207 A.2d 305,
312 (1965) (although strict tort liability is principally applied when dealing with per-
sonal injuries, "we reiterate ... that the responsibility of the maker should be no
different where damages to the article sold or to other property of the consumer is
involved").
15. See Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 59 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1981).
16. Three Missouri cases, all decided after Groppel, imply that Groppel is not
authority for the proposition that Missouri will allow a cause of action in negligence
where only economic loss has been sustained. Most recently, in Wilbur Waggoner
Equip. and Excavating Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 668 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. App., W.D.
1984), the court, without discussing Groppel, held that under Missouri law "recovery
in tort is limited to those cases where there is personal injury, damage to property other
than that sold, or destruction of the property sold due to some violent occurrence." Id.
at 603. In R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir.
1983), the court stated that Groppel "does not represent the last word in Missouri on
the negligence issue." Id. at 828. In light of decisions both before and after Groppel,
the Murray court concluded that "recovery in tort is limited to cases in which there has
been personal injury or property damage either to property other than the property
sold, or to the property sold where it was rendered useless by some violent occurrence
. " Id. Finally, in Clevenger & Wright Co. v. A.O. Smith Harvestone Prod., 625
S.W.2d 906 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981), decided only six months after Groppel, the court
stated that a plaintiff has no remedy in tort for pure economic loss. Id. at 909.
17. See Wilbur Waggoner, 668 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984); For-
rest v. Chrysler Corp., 632 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); Clevenger & Wright
Co., 625 S.W.2d 906, 909 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981); Gibson v. Reliable Chevrolet, 608
S.W.2d 471, 475 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980).
18. See Chandelor v. Lopus, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (1603). "Caveat Emptor" means
"Let the buyer beware." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
[Vol. 50
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and the action was for one on the case.' 9 It was not until 1778 that an action
in contract was held to lie.2" Although the tort action was still available, courts
gradually began to apply the warranty theory only in contract cases.2
This development has been an unfortunate one for the consumer. Since
warranty has been so closely associated with the contract action, it has carried
all the excess baggage associated with contract law. Under a warranty theory,
a plaintiff must overcome potential obstacles including the statutes of limita-
tion under the UCC, notice requirements to the seller, disclaimers and poten-
tial parol evidence rule problems, and privity requirements. The Uniform
Commercial Code22 has been regarded by most jurisdictions as the exclusive
authority governing economic loss cases.1
3
The warranty theory takes two forms. Express warranty liability is im-
posed as a result of representations made by the seller or manufacturer . 4 Im-
19. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960).
20. See Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778).
21. Prosser, supra note 19, at 1127. Prosser noted:
This may very possibly have been due merely to the accidental fact that cases
without contract simply did not arise. Nevertheless, once the contract action
was established it came into such universal and almost exclusive use that, in
the minds of nearly all courts and lawyers, warranty, whether express or im-
plied, became definitely identified with the contract, and regarded as an inte-
gral and inseparable part of it.
22. The Uniform Commercial Code succeeded the Uniform Sales Act. For a list
of those sections transformed from the U.S.A. to the U.C.C., see UNIF. COMMERCIAL
CODE, 1 U.L.A. XXXVII (1976).
23. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, supra note 2, at § 95A, at
680; see also Wilbur Waggoner Equip. and Excavating Co. v. Clark Equip., 668
S.W.2d 601, 602 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984) (pure economic loss damages "are limited to
those under the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code"); Forrest v.
Chrysler Corp., 632 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. App., E.D., 1982) (where pure economic loss
is involved, the "plaintiff is restricted to the remedies afforded under the Uniform
Commercial Code and the general law of sales").
24. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.2-313 (1978) explains express warranties are created
as follows:
[(1)](a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain cre-
ates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bar-
gain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to
the description ....
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller
use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commen-
dation of the goods does not create a warranty.
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 400.2-714.2-.2-715 (1978) govern the buyer's monetary remedy for
breach of warranty. Under § 400.2-714, the measure of damages is basically "the dif-
ference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted
5
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plied warranty liability arises by operation of law.25 An implied warranty can
be one of two types-an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose26
or an implied warranty of merchantability.27 Pure economic loss cases primar-
ily arise under the implied warranty of merchantability.
A. Suing Remote Manufacturers Under Express Warranty
Two leading cases are representative of the majority view which permits
recovery for pure economic loss under an express warranty theory. In Randy
Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,28 the court recognized that eco-
nomic loss claims were actionable in cases involving express warranties.2 9 The
court stated that the difference between personal harm or injury on the one
hand and economic loss on the other is irrelevant. "Since the basis of liability
turns not upon the character of the product but upon the representation, there
is no justification for a distinction on the basis of the type of injury suffered or
and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted . . . ." Under §
400.2-715, the buyer may also be able to recover incidental and consequential damages
resulting from the breach. Section 400.2-715 limits consequential damages that may be
recovered in that such damages are recoverable only to the extent that at the time of
contracting, the seller had reason to know of their existence and could not reasonably
have prevented them by cover or otherwise. This limitation also encompasses the
buyer's duty to mitigate his damages.
25. Both the implied warranty of merchantability and the implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose arise by operation of law "unless excluded or modified
by § 400.2-316." See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 400.2-314-.2-315 (1978). Mo. REV. STAT. §
400.2-316 (1978) discusses the proper methods of exclusion or modification of
warranties.
26. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.2-315 (1978) provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods there is unless
excluded or modified under [§ 400.2-306] an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose.
27. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.2-314 (1978) provides in part:
(I) Unless excluded or modified (section 400.2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller
is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind ...
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as...
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used ....
28. 1i N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962). In Randy Knit-
wear, the defendant resin manufacturer advertised in trade journals, by direct mail,
and on the labels and tags of garments that fabric treated with a special resin was
shrinkproof. The plaintiff, a clothes manufacturer, purchased the resin-treated fabric
from a textile manufacturer. When the fabric proved not to be shrinkproof, the plaintiff
sued the defendant for breach of express warranty. Id. at 9, 181 N.E.2d at 400, 226
N.Y.S.2d at 364. In affirming the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment, the New York Court of Appeals held that vertical privity was no
longer required in a breach of express warranty suit.
29. Id. The plaintiff sought pure economic loss damages in excess of $208,000.
Id. at 9, 181 N.E.2d at 400, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
[Vol. 50
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the type of article or goods involved.""0
Seely v. White Motor Co."' is the second leading case dealing with eco-
nomic loss under an express warranty theory. Seely is significant because the
plaintiff in that case was more akin to an "ordinary consumer" than was the
plaintiff in Randy Knitwear. In Seely, the Supreme Court of California af-
firmed the trial court's decision permitting the plaintiff to recover certain eco-
nomic losses icluding the cost of product repairs and lost profits under a
breach of express warranty theory. Moreover, the court ruled that vertical
privity as to the remote defendant manufacturer was not required under an
express warranty theory.
32
Although the trial court disallowed plaintiff's claim for repair costs, the
Seely court noted that had the plaintiff proved that the defect caused the acci-
dent, he could have recovered damages for physical injury to the product be-
cause "[p]hysical injury to property is so akin to personal injury that there is
no reason for distinguishing them."
33
B. Suing Remote Manufacturers Under Implied Warranty
Where no express warranty has been given, a plaintiff may sue for breach
of implied warranty of merchantability. 34 Missouri is among those jurisdic-
tions recognizing that a plaintiff may recover under an implied warranty the-
30. Id. at 15, 181 N.E.2d at 404, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
31. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). Plaintiff purchased a
truck for use in his business. Subsequently, the truck started to "gallop," or bounce
violently. The retailer of the truck, along with representatives of the manufacturer,
tried unsuccessfully to correct the galloping on numerous occasions spanning eleven
months. Finally, the brakes failed to operate while plaintiff was driving the truck and it
overturned. Although the plaintiff sustained no personal injuries, he did incur substan-
tial repair costs and lost profits.
32. "Since there was an express warranty to plaintiff in the purchase order, no
privity of contract was required." Id. at 14, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
33. Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24. The court found the defen-
dant liable "only because of its agreement as defined by its continuing practice over
eleven months. Without an agreement, defined by practice or otherwise, defendant
should not be liable for these commercial losses." Id. at 17, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal.
Rptr. at 23.
The Seely court specifically rejected a theory of recovery under strict liability in
tort, maintaining that this doctrine was developed "to govern the distinct problem of
physical injuries." Id. at 15, 403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
34. See supra note 26 for the quoted provision on implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose. When a breach occurs in this area, the buyer would bring his
cause of action under § 400.2-315 and not under § 400.2-314 dealing with implied
warranty of merchantability. This latter theory arises only when the goods are sold for
their ordinary purpose and not a particular purpose. See G. WALLACH, supra note 2, at
11-40 to 11-47. Although the two theories are separate, both are analyzed similarly.
Consequently, the textual discussion addresses only the breach of implied warranty of
merchantability. Conclusions drawn in the text under this latter theory are equally
applicable to the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
1985]
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ory in economic loss cases. For example, in Larry Goad & Co. v. Lordstown
Rubber Co.," 5 the plaintiff recovered damages under a breach of implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose and a breach of implied warranty of
merchantability for economic losses sustained from defective rubber purchased
under a contract with the defendant.38 The court stated that "under Missouri
law, a buyer may recover for economic loss resulting from the sale of an un-
merchantable product if the loss is proximately caused by the breach and the
buyer had in good faith mitigated his damages. ' 37
C. Potential Obstacles to Recovery Under Warranty
Statutes of limitation constitute a potential obstacle to recovery of pure
economic loss damages under a warranty theory. Depending upon whether a
plaintiff sues in tort or under warranty, one of two different statutes of limita-
tion is applicable to the action. The theory of the case determines not only
which statute controls but also whether application of that statute will work to
the aggrieved party's benefit or detriment. For example, in Missouri, the stat-
ute of limitations for tort actions is five years. 38 This period begins to run from
the time of injury.39 Comparatively, under a warranty theory, the action must
be brought within four years after tender of delivery, regardless of whether the
plaintiff is aware that a breach has in fact occurred. 40 The Code makes an
exception to this four year rule only when the warranty explicitly extends to
future performance, and discovery of the breach is not possible until such fu-
ture performance occurs.4
1
35. 560 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Mo. 1983). The plaintiff, a subcontractor, pur-
chased rubber from the defendant manufacturer. The defendant knew that the rubber
was to be used by plaintiff to line tanks for a general contractor. Because the rubber
was of poor quality, substantial delays occurred. Eventually, the general contractor
cancelled its contract with the plaintiff. Id. at 587.
36. Id. at 587.
37. Id. In accordance with Missouri law, which requires a buyer to mitigate his
damages in good faith, the court reduced the amount of plaintiff's judgment by an
amount equal to what the plaintiff would have saved had he mitigated his damages. Id.
at 588.
38. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120(4) (1978) provides that the following actions
must be brought within five years: "An action for taking, detaining or injuring goods or
chattels, including actions for the recovery of specific personal property, or for any
other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not therin
otherwise enumerated."
39. Davis v. Laclede Gas Co., 603 S.W.2d 554 (Mo. 1980) (statute of limitata-
tions begins to run when cause of action has accrued to person asserting it or such
wrong has been sustained, as will give right to bring and sustain suit).
40. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.2-725(1) (1978). Not all states have adopted the four
year limitations period. For example, the New Jersey period of limitations is six years
from the time the buyer suffers property damage and two years from the date of per-
sonal injury. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:14-1, 14-2 (West 1952); see also MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 541.05, 541.07 (West 1947).
41. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.2-725(2) (1978) states in part:
632 [Vol. 50
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Thus, in most product defect cases, a plaintiff who does not sustain harm
until four years after purchase will be barred from bringing any action for
recovery. If, however, a plaintiff has the option of bringing suit under a tort
theory as well, a plaintiff would still have five years from the time of injury to
file suit although the injury occurred well beyond four years from tender of
delivery. 42
Another potential obstacle to recovery under a warranty theory is the no-
tice requirement. As a condition precedent to bringing suit under this theory,
the buyer 43 must give the seller" notice of breach within a reasonable time
A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that
where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and
discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of
action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
42. Whether one statute of limitations is preferable to another depends upon
the state law controlling the case. For example, once personal injury is sustained, Mis-
souri's five year statute of limitations begins to run. This period is longer than the four
year period applicable to warranty actions. Compare Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.120(4)
(1978) with Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.2-725(1) (1978). But in some states the tort statute
of limitations is shorter than the warranty statute of limitations. If a plaintiff's injury
occurs shortly after purchase, then the tort statute of limitation will expire before the
warranty statute. Even though the tort limitations period has run, a plaintiff may still
sue under a warranty theory and thus take advantage of the longer warranty statute.
See, e.g., Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273, 277, 512 P.2d 776, 777
(1973) (contraceptive purchased in 1966, personal injury sustained in 1968, action
commenced in 1971; although state's two year tort limitation period expired, plaintiff
allowed to maintain action under breach of implied warranty of merchantability the-
ory). Not all states give plaintiffs this option. Some states maintain that in personal
injury cases, the plaintiff is limited to a single statute of limitations. See, e.g., Reid v.
Volkswagen of Am., 575 F.2d 1175, 1176 (6th Cir. 1978) (under Michigan law, where
personal injuries involved in a products liability case, the three year tort statute and not
the four year warranty statute of limitations is applicable); Heaver v. UniRoyal, Inc.,
63 N.J. 130, 156, 305 A.2d 412, 427 (1973) (when a plaintiff sues for personal injury
under a products liability theory, the general two year statute and not the four year
statute of limitations for warranty actions applies).
43. The word "buyer" is not to be read literally to mean the person who pur-
chased the product. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.2-607 comment 5 (Vernon 1965). Conse-
quently, the notice requirement extends to the third party beneficiaries given standing
to sue under the statute as well. There are cases that ignore the notice requirement
where personal injury is involved. See, e.g., McKneely v. Sperry Corp., 642 F.2d 1101,
1107 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Iowa law; an injured employee of a buyer need not give
notice); Mattos, Inc. v. Hash, 279 Md. 371, 378, 368 A.2d 993, 996 (Md. Ct. App.
1977) (non-purchaser third party beneficiary who suffers personal injury is not required
to notify the seller of a breach of warranty); Maybank v. S.S. Kresge, Co., 302 N.C.
129, 136, 273 S.E.2d 681, 685 (1981) (although notice is required in personal injury
cases, commencement of lawsuit serves as such notice where, as here, a lay consumer is
involved and the policies behind the notification requirement have been fulfilled).
44. In terms of who is a seller within the meaning of the statute, a majority ofjurisdictions apparently hold that each potential defendant, whether the manufacturer,
the distributor, or the wholesaler, must receive notice. Notice to one is not notice to all.
See, e.g., Leeper v. Banks, 487 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Ky. 1972) (although injured plaintiff
timely notified manufacturer of defective product, failure to notify seller in action
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after the breach has been or should have been discovered.4 5 Tort actions do not
require such notice. The language of the statute appears mandatory; thus, fail-
ure to give notice may bar recovery completely. Of course, the courts will de-
termine what a reasonable period entails.4 6 As a policy matter, the purpose of
the notice requirement is to "defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a
good faith consumer of his remedy. ' 47
Disclaimers constitute a third obstacle to recovery under a warranty the-
ory. If a seller makes an express warranty to the buyer, it may be difficult
later for him to disclaim his statements or acts because such disclaimer may
be inconsistent with the express warranty. Subject to the parol evidence rule,48
solely against seller barred plaintiff's suit for damages). The notice requirement serves
three basic functions: "First, notice provides the seller a chance to correct any de-
fect. . . .Second, notice affords the seller an opportunity to prepare for negotiation
and litigation. Third, notice provides the seller a safeguard against stale claims being
asserted after it is too late for the manufacturer or seller to investigate them." Prutch
v. Ford Motor Co., 618 P.2d 657, 661 (Coto 1980) (en banc). Thus, direct notice to
remote manufacturers is not always necessary. In Prutch, the plaintiff met the notice
requirement by giving timely notice to the seller, who in turn, promptly notified the
manufacturer. The court held that the notice fulfilled the three basic functions of the
notice requirement. Id. at 661. Other jurisdictions have held that it is unfair to require
a plaintiff to give notice to anyone other than his immediate seller. See Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 53 Md. App. 106, 116, 452 A.2d 192, 197 (1982) ("given
the complex marketing chains" of today, plaintiffs are not only unaware of the notice
requirement but in most cases, "even with legal advice" they have difficulty in locating
all potential remote sellers within a reasonable period of time); see also Santor v. A. &
M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 56, 207 A.2d 305, 307 (1965) (after immediate
seller went out of business, plaintiff spent almost twelve months relocating the seller
and contacting the manufacturer).
45, Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.2-607(3)(a) (1978).
46. Because the comments to the Code section dealing with notice are silent on
this, the courts have been left with the responsibility of interpreting what constitutes a
reasonable period. See G. WALLACH, supra note 2, at § 11.68, at 11-14(l).
47. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.2-607 comment 4 (Vernon 1965).
48. The parol evidence rule presents a major problem for the buyer-plaintiff
where the seller expressly represents one thing in oral negotiations but the final con-
tract between the parties makes no mention of the earlier representation. If the con-
tract is or appears to be the final and complete understanding between the parties, the
parol evidence rule operates to prohibit the introduction of evidence that would contra-
dict the written contract. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.2-202 (1978). For examples of how the
parol evidence rule operates to a buyer's detriment, see Hill v. BSAF Wyandotte Corp.,
696 F.2d 287, 291 (4th Cir. 1982) (commercial farmer could not introduce evidence of
oral representations made to him when, after receiving herbicide purchased from defen-
dant, he read label which properly disclaimed warranties other than those expressly
stated in the contract and, after reading, used the product); Investors Premium Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39, 45 (D.S.C. 1974) (purchaser of computer equip-
ment barred from introducing extrinsic evidence under parol evidence rule where con-
tract contained a very conspicuous clause stating that there were no other representa-
tions or understandings between the parties not presently contained in contract). In
theory, the rule could also work against a seller. Where, for example, the contract is
silent as to a seller's disclaimer of all liability, the seller will be precluded under the
rule from introducing extrinsic evidence to contradict the writing. As one can imagine,
[Vol. 50
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the Code deals with disclaimers by making them inoperative unless they are
somehow consistent with the express warranty.'
9
In cases of implied warranty, a seller has several options available to dis-
claim liability. Under the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
theory, a disclaimer must be in writing and be conspicuously displayed on the
document.50 The implied warranty of merchantability permits oral disclaimers,
but if the disclaimer is in writing, it must conspicuously mention the word
"merchantability."''S
Courts have found various ways to circumvent the disclaimer defense.
Some courts have held the seller to the literal requirements of the UCC,
52
while others have held that the disclaimer was not sufficiently "brought home"
to the buyer.5 3 Some courts approach the disclaimer problem under the uncon-
scionability provisions of the UCC.M If the seller properly and completely dis-
cases arising under this fact situation are virtually non-existent. Sellers today are too
sophisticated to 'forget' to include the disclaimer in the final contract.
49. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.2-316(1) provides:
[w]ords or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words
or conduct leading to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this
article on parol or extrinsic evidence (section 400.2-202) negation or limita-
tion is inoperative to the extent that such construction in unreasonable.
The comments to § 400.2-316(1) suggest that the purpose of the rule is to protect a
buyer, who has expressly been told or led to believe one thing, from a seller, who later
attempts to avoid these representations by imposing inconsistent, unexpected, or unbar-
gained for language in the disclaimer. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.2-316(2) comment 1
(Vernon 1965).
50. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.2-316(2) (1978).
51. Id.
52. E.g., Oldham's Farm Sausage Co. v. Salco, Inc. 633 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Mo.
App., W.D. 1982) (although commercial buyer involved, defendant's attempt to dis-
claim implied warranty found to be invalid because disclaimer did not mention word
"merchantability").
53. Id. (twenty-eight page contract failed to meet the conspicuous requirement
where fine print disclaimer appeared on reverse side of contract); see also Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 831
(1966); Note, supra note 8, at 410.
54. See, e.g., Funding Systems Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int'l., Inc., 597
S.W.2d 624, 634 n.11 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979) ("A disclaimer of implied warranty
could hardly be unconscionable in and of itself, without more, in view of § 2-316 which
specifically authorizes such disclaimer if done in an appropriate way .").
Under the proper circumstances, a plaintiff may be able to utilize the unconsciona-
bility provision of the Code for purposes of declaring the contract or parts thereof un-
enforceable. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.2-302 (1978). The policy behind granting courts
the power to deny enforcement of unconscionable contracts is to prevent "oppression
and unfair surprise," and not to disturb allocations of risks because of superior bargain-
ing power.
On the other hand, if a seller attempts to limit a buyer's remedy when a warranty
has been given, other problems arise. In such situations, the Code states that a seller's
attempt to limit consequential damages for personal injuries is prima facie unconscion-
able. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.2-719(3) (1978); Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883,
19851
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claims warranties, he has conformed with the requirements of the Code. Thus,
it becomes almost impossible for a court to invalidate the disclaimer.
The privity requirement is another obstacle to recovery of economic loss
under a warranty theory. Basic to contract law and warranty is the notion that
privity of contract must exist for one to sue or be sued.55 Privity has both
horizontal and vertical aspects. Horizontal privity focuses on who can be a
proper plaintiff and thus have standing to bring the suit. Vertical privity, on
the other hand, involves a determination of which persons can be sued.56 Natu-
rally, the buyer has standing to maintain an action, and in the event that he
sues his seller, there is no privity problem. 57 The Code specifically enumerates
those parties, other than a buyer, who may bring suit as well. Under the third
party beneficiary provision, anyone in the buyer's family, household, or even a
guest, if it is reasonable to expect such person to use, consume, or be affected
by the product, is granted standing to sue, provided that they have sustained
personal injuries. 58 Horizontal privity extends to both express and implied war-
ranties and the seller is barred from contracting otherwise.59
There is no explicit vertical privity provision in the UCC. However, it is
clear that a person with standing under the horizontal privity provision of the
UCC can sue the immediate seller.6 0 Application of vertical privity becomes
889, 430 S.W.2d 778, 781 (1968). By the same token, the UCC does not label the
attempt to limit damages resulting in economic loss as prima facie unconscionable. Mo.
REv. STAT. § 400.2-719(3) (1978); Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268
(D.C. Mich. 1976).
55. G. WALLACH, supra note 2, at § 11-15, at 11-70.
56. Prosser, supra note 43, at 799-800.
57. G. WALLACH, supra note 2, at § 11-15, at 11-71.
58. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.2-318 (1978) provides in part:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if
it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty ...
The comments indicate that the purpose of this third party beneficiary rule is to free
members of this class from the technical rules of privity. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.2-318
comment 2 (Vernon 1965). This section is strictly construed in Missouri. See Teel v.
American Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337, 345 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (provisions of §
400.2-318 extended only to a limited group of people; thus, where there is no privity
and the injured employee does not fall within the enumerated class, a breach of war-
ranty action cannot be maintained).
59. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.2-318 (1978) states that "A seller may not exclude
or limit the operation of this section." The comments state that this sentence does not
inhibit the seller from excluding or disclaiming warranties otherwise permitted under §
400.2-316. Nor does this provision interfere with the seller's right to limit remedies as
provided in § 400.2-718 and § 400.2-719. Rather, the provision is designed to forbid
the "exclusion of liability by the seller to the persons to whom the warranties which he
has made to his buyer would extend under this section." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.2-318
comment I (Vernon 1965).
60. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.2-318 comment 2 (Vernon 1965) which pro-
vides: "Implicit in the section is that any beneficiary of a warranty may bring a direct
action for breach of warranty against the seller whose warranty extends to him."
[Vol. 50
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problematical when the consumer attempts to sue a remote seller or manufac-
turer. The leading case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.6" addressed
this problem and held that where personal injuries are involved, a remote
seller could not assert lack of vertical privity as a valid defense to a breach of
implied warranty of merchantability claim.62
Following Henningsen's lead, many jurisdictions abandoned the vertical
privity requirement in personal injury actions.63 Several jurisdictions, however,
still retain this requirement.64 Likewise, a few courts have abandoned the ver-
tical privity requirement in economic loss actions,6 5 while others continue to
maintain the distinction between personal injury and economic injury and re-
quire privity in the latter situation.6
61. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
62. Id. at 413, 161 A.2d at 99-100.
63. See, e.g., Roberts v. General Dynamics, Convair Corp., 425 F. Supp. 688,
691 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (absence of vertical privity between personally-injured plaintiff
and remote manufacturer did not bar plaintiff from maintaining breach of implied war-
ranty action); Fredricks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 309, 363 A.2d 460,
463 (1976) (injured automobile guest has standing to sue manufacturer of vehicle
under third party beneficiary provisions of the UCC despite lack of privity); Barker v.
Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870, 875-76 (Okla. 1979) (lack of vertical privity not a
bar to breach of waranty theory where plaintiff lost 90 % of vision in right eye when
soda bottle exploded in his face); see also Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372
S.W.2d 41, 53 (Mo. 1963) (en banc) (did not involve personal injury). In Morrow, the
plaintiffs recovered against a remote seller under the implied warranty of
merchantability theory. The plaintiffs purchased a gas range which proved defective
and caused extensive fire damage to the range and other property. The court stated
that the requirement of privity will not be strictly enforced where to do so would shock
the court's sense of justice. The court continued:
Research also shows that over the years the courts of many of the states have
considered and, with varying degrees of forthrightness, applied the rule of
implied warranty without privity of contract (in effect, strict liability to the
manufacturers of products which have caused injury to persons and property
by reason of defects in construction or assemblage, which rendered such prod-
ucts imminently dangerous when used for the purpose for which they were
manufactured and sold on the market to the "consumer" or user).
Id. at 53.
64. See, e.g., Chance v. Richards Mfg. Co., 499 F. Supp. 102, 105 (E.D. Wash.
1980) (personal injury action) ("[iun light of the admitted absence of privity, plaintiff
is precluded from recovery for breach of an implied warranty").
65. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 291 (Alaska
1976) ("[a] manufacturer can be held liable for direct economic loss attributable to a
breach of his implied warranties, without regard to privity of contract between the
manufacturer and the ultimate purchaser"); Cova v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 26
Mich. App. 602, 609, 182 N.W.2d 800, 804 (1970) (consumer allowed to sue manufac-
turer directly for economic losses under implied warranty theory); Santor v. A. & M.
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 59, 207 A.2d 305, 309 (1965) (no just reason exists for
maintaining vertical privity requirement in a pure economic loss case "simply because
loss of value of the article sold is the only damage resulting from the breach").
66. See, e.g., Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97
Idaho 348, -, 544 P.2d 306, 312 (1975) (privity of contract still required'in cases of
pure economic loss); Candlelight Homes, Inc. v. Zornes, 414 N.E.2d 980, 982 (Ind. Ct.
1985]
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III. RECOVERY UNDER A TORT THEORY FOR NEGLIGENCE
A. General Discussion
Unlike warranty actions, the court decisions are not uniform when a
plaintiff sues under a negligence theory. While several jurisdictions allow eco-
nomic loss recovery under a negligence theory, 67 the majority apparently do
not. In these latter jurisdictions, plaintiffs are directed to sue in warranty. 68
In those jurisdictions recognizing a plaintiff's right to bring a cause of
action in negligence, the underlying principle is that, the manufacturer as fa-
ther of the transaction, is liable for damages, whether personal, property, or
purely economic, 9 where his negligence is the cause of the plaintiff's inju-
ries.70 Further, if it is "reasonably foreseeable to an ordinarily prudent person
that injury will reasonably and probably result from his failure to exercise
ordinary care" 71 the manufacturer can be found liable in negligence for failure
App. 198 1) (privity must be shown in breach of implied warranty action to recover for
loss of bargain); Hole v. General Motors Corp., 83 A.D.2d 715, 716, 442 N.Y.S.2d
638, 640 (App. Div. 1981) ("While the citadel of privity has been shaken, it has not
been altogether razed ... ") (where no personal injuries involved, privity is still
required).
67. See Berwind Corp. v. Litton Indus., 532 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1976); Jig the
Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975);
Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873
(1958); Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 575 P.2d 1383 (1978); W.R.H., Inc.
v. Economy Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42 (Utah 1981).
68. See LeSueur Creamery v. Haskon, Inc., 660 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145,
45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 87 Iii. App. 3d
338, 408 N.E.2d 1041 (1980); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d
159 (Minn. 1981); Trans World Airlines v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148
N,.S.2d 284 (1955).
69. See, State ex reL Western Seed Prod. Seed Corp. v. Campbell, 250 Or. 262,
269-70, 442 P.2d 215, 218 (1968) (en banc) (citing Franklin, supra note 2, at 989),
wherein the court noted:
[W]e see no reason why the availability of a tort remedy should depend upon
whether the harm was traumatic. The manufacturer should have a duty of
exercising due care to avoid foreseeable harm to the users of his product. As
stated by one writer, economic loss from defective products is "within the
range of reasonable manufacturer foresight . . . (and this foreseeability)
should raise at least a duty of due care unless some compelling economic or
social or administrative reason dictates otherwise.
Id.
70. Cova v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 605, 182 N.W.2d
800, 802 (1970). The Cova court also noted that since recovery under a strict liability
theory is available, there is really no need for a plaintiff to use the negligence theory.
Id. at 609, 182 N.W.2d at 804; see also W.R.H., Inc. v. Economy Builders Supply,
633 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah 1981).
71. Berwind Corp. v. Litton Indus., 532 F.2d 1, 8 (7th Cir. 1976) (economic
losses recoverable due to manufacturer's negligent design of equipment).
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to so exercise that degree of care required under the circumstances. Thus, it is
not necessary that the manufacturer "foresee either the precise injury that
results therefrom or the manner in which it occurs.""2
The belief that the UCC provisions are the exclusive source of authority
in pure economic loss cases is the major rationale for denial of recovery in
negligence. Imposing tort theories of recovery would, thus, "totally emasculate
these provisions of the UCC. Clearly, the legislature did not intend for tort
law to circumvent the statutory scheme of the UCC."' The agreement and
applicable UCC provisions should control since the parties have dealt at arm's
length and agreed to be bound by the terms of the contract. Contract law
would become indistinguishable from tort law if tort liabilities were imposed."'
"In effect, contract law would become a branch of tort law. The law of con-
tract would be used merely to define the duties that one owes to another but
the law of tort would determine the remedy for violation of those duties." '75
B. Uncertain Application in Missouri
Missouri courts denied recovery for economic loss under a negligence the-
ory in these cases until 1981, when the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Eastern District, in Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co.,76 recognized a
tort cause of action where the plaintiff alleged purely economic losses.7' How-
ever, every case decided since 1981 has reverted to the pre-1981 view without
adequately rationalizing the retreat from Groppel7
Prior to the Groppel decision, the Missouri Supreme Court expressly re-
fused to recognize a negligence theory of recovery in Crowder v.
Vandendeale.7 9 This has been the last word on the subject from the Missouri
Supreme Court. 0 In Crowder, plaintiffs purchased a house built by defendant
72. Id.
73. Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn.
1981).
74. Album Graphics v. Beatrice Foods Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d 338, 350, 408
N.E.2d 1041, 1050 (1980).
75. Id.
76. 616 S.W.2d 49, 52 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981).
77. Id. at 52.
78. See R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir.
1983); Wilbur Waggoner Equip. and Excavating Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 668 S.W.2d
601 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984); Forrest v. Chrysler Corp., 632 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. App., E.D.
1982); Clevenger & Wright Co. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prod., 625 S.W.2d 906
(Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
79. 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
80. But see Aronson's Men's Stores v. Potter Elec. Signal Co., 632 S.W.2d 472
(Mo. 1982) (en banc). In Aronson, the court denied a store owner recovery under a
strict liability theory when he failed to establish that the burglar alarm purchased for
use in his business was unreasonably dangerous. In the final paragraph of the opinion
the court states that "Appellant's proper submission was under negligence or warranty
concepts." Id. at 474. This sentence seemingly permits a plaintiff to maintain an action
1985] 639
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contractor. As settling occurred, the walls and front porch cracked. Plaintiffs
sued to recover all expenses incurred in repairing the defects. Their theory was
grounded in negligence for failure to construct the house in a workmanlike
manner.81 The court concluded that the "implied warranty recovery provides
an adequate and appropriate remedy ... and that a second theory of recovery
based on failure to use ordinary care should not be authorized." 82 Accordingly,
the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' suit for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.83
Three years later, Groppel v. United States Gypsum Co.84 authorized re-
covery under a negligence theory. Plaintiff-subcontractor purchased fireproof-
ing materials required to be of a specific density for adequate insulation. The
material was to be spray-applied to the inside steel structure of a thirty-five
story building. In the event of fire, the insulation would minimize and delay
heat conduction to the steel.85 After the substance was applied to most of the
building, spot checks by plaintiff revealed that the product was not maintain-
ing the required density. A meeting between plaintiff, the developer of the
product, the inspector of the product, and other parties resulted in a decision
that plaintiff should respray the area to an extra thickness. This measure
would compensate for the lack of density upon the first spraying. In respray-
ing, plaintiff expended substantial time and money with the ensuing losses
forcing plaintiff out of business.86 The plaintiff brought suit against the manu-
facturer of the product and recovered judgment under a negligence theory. 7
The court rejected the defendant's claim that Crowder should control the
case and distinguished Crowder on several grounds. First, Groppel involved
the sale of goods governed by the UCC whereas Crowder involved the sale of
real estate which is not governed by the UCC.8 Second, Groppel involved
goods unfit for their intended purpose from the time of manufacture. By con-
trast, Crowder involved deterioration of a house. 9
The third distinction apparently is the most important one. Groppel in-
volved product distribution. The manufacturer sold the product to a seller who
in negligence for pure economic loss but has never been cited for such a proposition. In
light of the conflicting interpretations involved in these economic loss cases, it is imper-
ative that the Missouri Supreme Court give definite guidance to the lower courts.
81. Crowder, 564 S.W.2d at 880.
82. Id. at 884.
83. Id.
84. 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981).
85. Id. at 52.
86. Id. at 53-54.
87. Id. at 52. The court noted that the decision reached recognizes economic
loss as "potentially devasting to the buyer of an unmerchantable product and that it is
unjust to preclude any recovery from the manufacturer for such loss because of lack of
privity, when the slightest physical injury can give rise to strict liability under the same
circumstances." Id. at 59.
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was not expected to use the product but only hold it for resale. Consequently,
the product might change hands several times before it ultimately reached the
final user or consumer.90 This chain of distribution scenario is unlike the sale
of the house in Crowder. In the latter case, the builder sold the house to the
first purchaser who actually lived in and used the property. Risks were already
allocated in the contract of sale between those parties. In Crowder, a second
purchaser sought to hold the builder liable.9' When a builder sells a home, he
sells directly to the ultimate consumer. When the sale of goods is involved, the
manufacturer typically sells them to a middleman whose sole purpose is to
resell the goods at a profit to the ultimate consumer. Thus, the court con-
cluded that the policy considerations behind these cases differed
considerably. 9 '
Groppel, however, has not been persuasive in subsequent Missouri deci-
sions. In essence, the courts have ignored Groppel and continue to apply a
Crowder-type analysis in pure economic loss cases. For example, in Clevenger
& Wright Co. v. A.O. Smith Harvestone Products, Inc.,93 decided eleven
months after Groppel, the plaintiff purchased a grain storage silo manufac-
tured by defendant. When a tornado ripped the silo from its concrete founda-
tion, plaintiff claimed damages for economic losses caused by the silo's de-
struction. In essence, plaintiff maintained that defendant had a duty to use
ordinary care in producing a tornado-proof silo. 4 The court rejected this argu-
ment and specifically relied on Crowder to deny recovery on the negligence
claim, with no mention of Groppel.95
In R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp.,96 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit discussed both the Crowder and
Groppel decisions. Plaintiff-contractor claimed that defendant-supplier
breached express and implied warranties97 and was negligent in supplying de-
fective vision and spandel panels. Replacement with matching panels was im-
possible since defendant-supplier discontinued manufacture of the color of tint
used in the original panels and refused the contractor's demands to manufac-
ture additional panels of the same tint. The plaintiff alleged that its economic
90. Id.
91. Crowder, 564 S.W.2d at 880.
92. Groppel at 60.
93. 625 S.W.2d 906 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
94. Id. at 908.
95. Id. at 909. The plaintiff sought recovery under breach of express warranty,
negligence, and strict tort liability. As to plaintiff's warranty claim, the court found
that even if the disclaimers were invalid, the plaintiff would still be barred since he
failed to bring suit within four years after tender as required by the statute of limita-
tions. Id. at 908.
96. 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983).
97. The express warranty claims were dismissed due to the expiration of the
four-year statute of limitations. The court found no warranty extending to future per-
formance. Id. at 821-24.
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losses exceeded $3,000,000.98
Regarding the contractor's negligence theory, the court stated that both
before and after Groppel, the general view in Missouri was that "recovery in
tort is limited to cases in which there has been personal injury, or property
damage either to property other than the property sold, or to the property sold
when it was rendered useless by some violent occurrence."9 9 In discussing the
Groppel decision, the court stated:
We recognize that the Missouri Court of Appeals decision in Groppel...
appears to support appellant's cause of action in negligence seeking recovery
for economic loss rising from the failure of a manufacturer to supply a mer-
chantable product. However, we believe that Crowder, Clevenger & Wright,
Gibson, and Forrest, provide "other persuasive data that the highest court of
the state would decide otherwise."100
Thus, the court held that the plaintiff was barred from suing in negligence to
recover for economic losses. 1 '
Finally, Wilbur Waggoner Equipment & Excavating Co. v. Clark Equip-
ment Co.,1 0 2 a recent Missouri case dealing with recovery for economic loss,
reinforces the Crowder view. After purchasing a crane manufactured by de-
fendant, plaintiff discovered design and manufacturing defects in the machin-
ery.1 0 3 In a somewhat brief opinion, the court stated that the law in Missouri
is "that recovery in tort for purely economic damages is limited to those cases
where there is personal injury, damage to property other than that sold, or
destruction of the property sold due to some violent occurrence."104
Curiously, both Groppel and Wilbur were decided by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eastern District. Groppel was decided by Division Two of the
court 0 5 whereas Wilbur was decided by Division Three.108 The Wilbur deci-
sion failed even to cite Groppel. Apparently even within the Eastern District
the law in Missouri is uncertain in this area. It is questionable whether, in
fact, one can reconcile or distinguish these two cases. In Wilbur, the court
apparently chose to follow cases subsequent to Groppel and ignore Groppel
insofar as it stood for the proposition that one could recover for pure economic
loss under a negligence theory.
98. This three million dollar figure represented damages incurred by replace-
ment of defective panels and diminution in the value of the building because of unavail-
able matching panels. Id. at 821.
99. Id. at 828.
100. Id. at 829.
101. Id.
102. 668 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984).
103. Id. at 601.
104. Id. at 603. The plaintiff's warranty claims were barred by the four year
statute of limitations, and the facts did not support an action under tort principles. Id.
105. 616 S.W.2d at 49.
106. 668 S.W.2d at 601.
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IV. RECOVERY UNDER A STRICT LIABILITY THEORY
A. General Discussion
Strict tort liability allows a plaintiff to recover from a manufacturer with-
out the obstacles imposed by warranty and without the burden of proving neg-
ligence.107 In this respect, it is the more favored theory of the three for plain-
tiffs. The Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth the doctrine of strict
liability in section 402A.10 8 Missouri adopted the Restatement approach in
1969.10 9 In spite of the impact that strict liability has had on tort law, most
jurisdictions, including Missouri, have refused to allow recovery for pure eco-
nomic loss under this theory."x0 On the other hand, as courts allow a cause of
action for economic loss under a negligence theory, it may only be a matter of
time before they extend recovery for such a claim to strict liability in tort.'
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold.
2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
109. See Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
110. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626
F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying Illinois law, the court refused to extend strict
tort liability theory for pure economic loss); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co.,
91 111. 2d 69, 81, 435 N.E.2d 443, 448-49 (1982) (economic losses sustained as a result
of cracks in grain storage tank not recoverable under strict tort liability) (opinion ana-
lyzes various cases from other jurisdictions); Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Elgood Mayo
Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 667, 451 N.Y.S.2d 720, 436 N.E.2d 667 (1982) (lack of any repre-
sentations made to plaintiff, lack of privity, and solely economic losses precluded plain-
tif'srecovery under strict tort liability); Industrial Uniform Rental Co. v. International
Harvester Co., 463 A.2d 1085, 1093 (Pa. Super. 1983) (commercial buyer of trucks
denied recovery under a strict tort liability theory against manufacturer for economic
losses suffered when trucks developed cracks and failures in the frames) (opinion also
analyzes various cases from other jurisdictions). Missouri is clear in its position that
recovey under strict tort theory liability will be denied where only economic losses are
involved. See Wilbur Waggoner Equip. and Excavating Co. v. Clark Equip., 668
S.W.2d 601, 603 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984); Forrest v. Chrysler Corp. 632 S.W.2d 29, 31
(Mo. App., E.D, 1982); Clevenger & Wright Co. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prod., 625
S.W.2d 906, 909 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981); Gibson v. Reliable Chevrolet, 608 S.W.2d
471, 475 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980).
111. The difference between negligence and strict liability in the majority of
cases is minimal. Prosser reasoned that "[w]here the action is against the manufacturer
of the product, an honest estimate might very well be that there is not one case in a
hundred in which strict liability would result in recovery where negligence does not."
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Seely v. White Motor Co.,1 1 2 best summarizes the policy considerations
that have led courts to reject application of strict liability to economic loss
cases. Seely involved the purchase of a defective truck. The specific holding of
the case allowed recovery under warranty and the extensive dicta denied re-
covery under strict tort liability. The court distinguished strict tort liability
from the law of sales, stating that the former was uniquely designed to govern
economic relations. 113 Three distinctions were made. First, when a defective
product which creates an unreasonable risk of harm is placed into the stream
of commerce and later causes physical or personal injuries, it is appropriate to
hold the manufacturer liable for failure to meet a safety standard. By placing
the product into the market, the manufacturer represents that the product is
safe for its intended use and therefore is responsible for resulting injuries when
put to such use. When economic losses are involved, different considerations
exist. A plaintiff is seeking to hold a manufacturer liable simply because the
product has not measured up to the level of performance expected. Therefore,
a plaintiff should be limited to contract theories of recovery.1 14
Second, the court reasoned that the resulting burden on manufacturers
would be excessive and unmanageable if strict liability were the standard.
Manufacturers would be liable for business losses in cases where the product
did not meet subsequent purchasers' specific needs, even though those needs
were communicated only to the dealer. 1 5 Third, strict liability would preclude
the manufacturer from disclaiming liability since its very purpose is "to pre-
vent a manufacturer from defining the scope of his responsiblity for harm
caused by his products."" 6 The Seely court found the defendant liable only
because the defendant gave a warranty and numerous efforts by the defendant
Prosser, supra note 16, at 1114. Plaintiffs may be aided by res ipsa loquitur as an
equivalent doctrine, but once the cause of the harm is shown to emanate from the
defendant, the plaintiff gets to the jury and "a jury verdict for the defendant on the
negligence issue is virtually unknown." Id. at 1115.
112. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (en banc).
113. Id. at 15, 403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
114. Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. The court stated:
A consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with bear-
ing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market. He can,
however, be fairly charged with the risk that the product will not match his
economic expectations unless the manufacturer agrees that it will.
Id.
115. Id. at 17, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22. The court stated:
If under these circumstances defendant is strictly liable in tort for the com-
mercial loss suffered by plaintiff, then it would be liable for business losses of
other truckers caused by the failure of its trucks to meet the specific needs of
their businesses, even though those needs . . . were communicated ony to the
dealer. . . .The manufacturer would be liable for damages of unknown and
unlimited scope.
Id.; see also Note, Products Liability-Manufacturer Not Liable for Economic Losses
of Consumer Under Theory of Strict Liability, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 758, 763 (1966).
116. Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 17, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
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to repair the truck proved fruitless.1 7 The truck was not unreasonably danger-
ous within the meaning of section 402A merely because the truck did not rise
to the. level of performance plaintiff expected.""
Notwithstanding the analysis in Seely, a few courts maintain that a claim
for economic loss is actionable under a strict tort liability theory.119 Santor v.
A.& M. Karagheusian, Inc.,120 is the leading case. In Santor, decided four
months prior to Seely, the plaintiff purchased carpet for home use. Though
represented as first grade quality, the carpet developed unusual lines immedi-
ately after being installed. Plaintiff recovered judgment against defendant
manufacturer under a breach of implied warranty of merchantability.
121
Significantly, the Santor court stated in dicta that the manufacturer's lia-
bility could have been cast in a much simpler form-namely, in strict tort
liability for pure economic loss.1 22 According to the court, the purchasing pub-
lic lacks adequate knowledge or opportunity to discover defects and has no
choice but to place full reliance on the manufacturer's skill, care and reputa-
tion. In placing its product on the market, the manufacturer, in effect, assures
the public that the product is suitable and safe for its intended use. The fact
that a consumer suffers only economic loss does not relieve the manufacturer
of this responsibility. The court reasoned that holding the ultimate consumer
or user of the product to the often harsh requirements of warranty ignores the
117. Id. at 17, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
118. Id. at 16, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22; see supra text accompany-
ing note 127; see also Note, Products Liability in Tort Cover?, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 385,
389 (1965).
119. See, e.g., Cova v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 609, 182
N.W.2d 800 (1970); Santor v. A.& M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 66, 207 A.2d
305, 312 (1965); Spring Motors Distrib. v. Ford Motor Co., 191 N.J. Super. 22,
465 A.2d 530, 541 (1983) (recovery in strict tort liability for pure economic losses
extended to commercial loss.
120. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
121. Id. at 63, 207 A.2d at 310. The seller continuously reassured plaintiff that
the lines would "walk out." When the condition worsened, the plaintiff attempted to
contact the seller eight months after delivery. It was at this time that the plaintiff
discovered that the seller had gone out of business. It took the plaintiff months to locate
the seller, although the exact amount of time taken is not specified in the opinion.
Eventually the plaintiff contacted the manufacturer. When communications with the
manufacturer failed to produce any results, the plaintiff brought suit for breach of
implied warranty of merchantability. Id. at 56, 207 A.2d at 307. The court stated that
lack of privity would no longer be a defense. "The manufacturer is the father of the
transaction. He makes the article and puts it in the channels of trade for sale to the
public. . . . The dealer is simply a way station, a conduit on its trip from manufac-
turer to consumer." Id. at 59-60, 207 A.2d at 309. The manufacturer was ultimately
held liable for breach of warranty. Id. at 63, 207 A.2d at 310.
122. Id. at 63, 207 A.2d at 311. The court also noted that "[iun this era of
complex marketing practices and assembly line manufacturing conditions, restrictive
notions of privity of contract between manufacturer and consumer must be put aside
and the realistic view of strict tort liability adopted." Id. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312.
1985]
21
Tillman: Tillman: Product Defects Resulting in Pure Economic Loss:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
reality of the relationship between this person and the manufacturer. 123 The
consuming public, powerless to protect itself, should not be made to bear the
cost of injuries or damages resulting from defective products.12 4
In Seely, Justice Peters wrote a strong concurring opinion supporting
strict tort liability. 25 According to Justice Peters, the restrictive provisions re-
lating to warranty should not apply in cases involving ordinary consumers.
Moreover, the focus in economic loss cases should not be on the nature of the
damages sustained. As long as the damages proximately resulted from the de-
fect, liability should exist. By contrast, if the parties possess equal bargaining
power, warranty rightfully applies. Since one of the major purposes underlying
strict tort liability is to protect powerless consumers, strict tort actions rather
than warranty actions are best suited to consumers. 2 '
Classifying the types of plaintiffs as opposed to the types of harm suffered
furthers the policies behind both strict tort liability and the law of sales.
Under this distinction, the ordinary consumer, unaware of the intricacies of
the law of sales "would receive the protection he needs under the doctrine of
strict liability. '127 By the same token, the merchant, "familiar with the world
of commercial transactions and aware of the problems involved when defective
goods are sold would remain under the control of the warranty sections of the
123. Id. at 64, 207 A.2d at 311. The court reasoned that "[o]rdinarily there is no
contract in a real sense between a manufacturer and an expected ultimate consumer of
his product." Id.
124. Id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 311-12. The court did not explicity distinguish ordi-
nary consumers from commercial buyers but referred only to the "consuming public."
In discussing the manufacturer's obligation once it places the product on the market,
the court stated:
[The manufacturer's obligation] becomes what in justice it ought to be-an
enterprise liability, and one which should not depend upon the intricacies of
the law of sales. The purpose of such liability is to insure that the cost of
injuries or damage, either to the goods sold or to other property, resulting
from defective products, is not borne by the injured or damaged persons who
ordinarily are powerless to protect themselves.
Id. Defectiveness of the carpet was conceded by the defendant. Defective articles were
defined by the court as those "not reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such articles are sold and used." Id. at 67, 207 A.2d at 313. This definition is almost
identical to that found under breach of implied warranty of merchantability. See supra
note 27. Because of the lines that developed in this top quality carpet, it was not rea-
sonably fit for the ordinary purpose for which it was sold and used. Thus, even if defec-
tiveness were not conceded, it appears that the court would have found the defect pre-
sent anyway. Whether an unreasonable risk of harm was thereby created was not
discussed by the court. In New Jersey, strict tort liability exists once the plaintiff
proves a defect (as defined above), which arose from design or manufacturer, and this
defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Id.
125. Seely 63 Cal. 2d at 20, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24 (Peters, J.,
concurring). Unlike the majority, Justice Peters did not find a breach of express war-
ranty for the reason that the plaintiff did not rely on the warranty. He concurred in the
judgment because he felt that the plaintiff should prevail under a strict tort theory.
126. Id. at 27, 403 P.2d at 157, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Peters, J., concurring).
127. Id. (Peters, J., concurring).
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B. Strict Liability for Economic Loss in Missouri
With the exception of the Groppel case, Missouri courts have uniformly
adopted the Seely view. 129 The policy reasons for justifying the denial of a
strict tort liability for economic loss stem from tradition. Safety and freedom
from physical harm have traditionally been entitled to protection. Mere eco-
nomic loss, however, has never been entitled to any more protection than the
parties contracted to give it. With economic loss, a plaintiff is concerned pri-
marily with the failure of the product to meet his standard of quality.130 "In
the absence of some express agreement to the contrary, the standard of quality
will be presumed to be that of the implied warranty term-reasonable fitness
for use."113
In Gibson v. Reliable Chevrolet, Inc.,x' 2 decided prior to Groppel, the
purchaser of a new automobile brought suit against the defendant seller for
economic losses suffered when the heater core of the engine ruptured. The
coolant escaped, creating excessive heat and requiring replacement of the mo-
tor. Relying on Crowder, the Gibson court denied recovery under a strict tort
liability theory. 3 3 After noting that the claim involved neither personal injury
nor damage to property other than the automobile, the court stated that under
these circumstances, "it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish that the
Chevrolet had been rendered useless by some violent occurrence."'13' There-
fore, in the absence of personal injury, damage to other property, or damage
resulting from a violent occurrence to the product itself, strict tort liability
could not be imposed under Missouri law.135
A post-Groppel case, Forrest v. Chrysler Corp.,'36 reinforced the ap-
proach taken in Gibson. In Forrest, plaintiff sued the seller and the manufac-
turer under warranty theories when a truck he purchased proved to be defec-
tive. Plaintiff sought to recover damages for the lost market value of the truck,
for lost profits, and for repair and replacement costs. Because the case was
128. Note, supra note 114, at 766.
129. See supra note 123.
130. Crowder, 564 S.W.2d at 882.
131. Id. at 882. The Crowder court specifically held that a cause of action in
negligence would not lie. Although the court did not explicitly discuss recovery under a
strict liability theory, all cases subsequent to Crowder and Groppel have held that a
cause of action for economic loss, whether in negligence or strict liability, will not be
permitted for the same policy reasons as those enunciated by the Crowder court. See
supra note 110 and cases cited.
Prosser also agreed that strict tort liability should be unavailablq as a theory of
recovery in this area. See Prosser, supra note 43, at 823.
132. 608 S.W.2d 471 (Mo, App., S.D. 1980).
133. Id. at 472-73.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 474.
136. 632 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
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submitted to the jury under a strict tort liability instruction, part of the judg-
ment was reversed and remanded for a new trial as against the manufac-
turer.1 3 7 No personal injuries were involved in this case. Under these circum-
stances, "Crowder and Gibson place Missouri into the Seely group of courts
which reject strict liability for defective products where the loss sustained is
economic only. In that posture plaintiff is restricted to the remedies afforded
under the Uniform Commercial Code and the general law of sales. ' 13 8 Grop-
pel was not discussed in the opinion.
C. Harsh Results of Excluding Tort Recovery
Limiting plaintiffs to warranty theories will in many instances produce
harsh results. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.'39
typically illustrates the harshness of the rule. In Jones, the defendant, a manu-
facturer and installer of roofing products, advised the plaintiff, a commercial
buyer, regarding the type of roofing materials plaintiff needed in constructing
a steel finishing plant. Because the roof was to be extraordinarily large (1.3
million square feet) and because the plant would be located in an area with
severe temperature fluctuations as well as high wind velocities, the building
required a roof that could withstand severe wear and tear. 40
The defendant recommended materials that it represented as durable,
easy to repair, virtually waterproof, and capable of withstanding uplift caused
by winds in excess of 120 miles per hour. The plaintiff included these recom-
mendations in its plans. Upon completion, the roof began to blister, wrinkle,
and crack. Rain-water, entering through the roof, damaged plaintiff's steel
products and caused electrical outages. Eighty miles per hour winds blew
away 93,800 square feet of the roof.' 4'
The plaintiff sued the defendant under strict tort liability and breach of
warranty theories. Applying Illinois law, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that claims in strict liability and negligence were
not actionable "[i]nasmuch as Illinois law does not permit a claim for eco-
nomic loss to be premised on tort theories.1' 42 Furthermore, the plaintiff was
137. Id. at 30-31. The court found that the plaintiff's first amended petition
stated a cause of action in warranty; therefore, it was reversible error to instruct the
jury under strict tort liability. Id. at 32.
138. Id. at 31.
139. 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980).
140. Id. at 281.
141. Id. at 282.
142. Id. at 289. The Jones court relied on Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental
Can Co., 72 II1. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1966), and Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v.
Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977), as authority for rejecting
claims in strict liability. 626 F.2d at 284. In Rhodes, plaintiff purchased aerosal cans
from defendant-manufacturer to package his products. The cans leaked. Although the
court recognized that plaintiff had a cause of action for breach of implied warranty, it
specifically denied plaintiff's claim for strict tort liability, stating simply that it was not
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also barred from recovery under a warranty theory. First, the court held that
the UCC was inapplicable. The contract provided that the defendant would
not only supply materials but also assist and supervise the plaintiff. Since the
UCC deals exclusively with transactions in goods, the relationship was not
addressed by the UCC.143 The court stated that even if the UCC were applica-
ble, plaintiff would be barred because delivery occurred over four years prior
to plaintiff's suit.144 In addition, the running time under the warranty was not
explicitly extended under the limited future performance exception of the
UCC. 145 As a result, plaintiff could not recover under any theory.
The warranty theory limitation has produced similar unjust results in
Missouri. For example, if Groppel were decided under the Seely rationale, the
plaintiff would have been forced to bear the losses which subsequently put him
out of business.
V. CONCLUSION
In Missouri, it appears that the warranty theory is the only route of re-
covery available to the plaintiff with purely economic losses. Even if a cause of
action in negligence were recognized, numerous obstacles would still hamper a
court's recognizing actionable claims in strict liability. Even if Justice Peters'
distinction between types of plaintiffs is adopted or the Santor definition of
defect is adopted, plaintiff's would still have a potential problem with the un-
reasonably dangerous requirement of section 402A.
In Santor, it is difficult to imagine how unsightly lines could cause an
unreasonable risk of harm. On the other hand, the violent bouncing of the
truck in Seely did create such an unreasonable risk. Unfortunately, the plain-
tiff in Seely was unable to trace this defect to the failure of the brakes and
resulting overturning of the truck.
Another obstacle arises where the product itself is damaged. In Missouri,
a plaintiff is denied recovery in strict liability unless there is a violent occur-
"persuaded that the doctrine of 'strict tort liability' should be applied here." Rhodes,
72 111. App. 2d at 368, 219 N.E.2d at 730. In Koplin, plaintiff purchased two air-
conditioning units from defendant that failed to work properly. Plaintiff sought to re-
cover costs of replacement and repair. The court held that plaintiff could not recover
under a warranty theory because the defendant had expressly disclaimed any warran-
ties. Plaintiff was also barred from recovering under a tort theory: "We conclude, as
did the court, without analysis, in Rhodes, that tort theory (there strict liability, here
negligence) does not extend to permit recovery against a manufacturer for solely 'eco-
nomic losses' absent property damage or personal injury from the use of the product."
Koplin, 49 II. App. 3d at 203, 364 N.E.2d at 107.
143. 626 F.2d at 290.
144. Under Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.2-725, the four year statute of limitations
begins to run when delivery is made. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
145. 626 F.2d at 291. For the provision on future performance under the Code
see supra note 41.
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rence. 146 This term has been defined as "a calamitous event that is likely to
threaten traditional tort injuries of bodily harm or damage to other nearby
property-such as occurs in a case involving unreasonably dangerous prod-
ucts. 147 Examples would be fire, explosion, vehicular collision and the like.
No such violent occurrence was present in Santor and it is arguable whether
this requirement was met in Seely.
Despite these obstacles, policy considerations for granting the consumer a
cause of action in tort for pure economic loss outweigh those advanced for
denying such recovery. As pointed out earlier, there are stronger arguments
for denying tort recovery when the plaintiff is a commercial buyer.14 8 Basing
recovery on the type of plaintiffs involved as opposed to the types of loss in-
volved is the better alternative. Being a commercial buyer alone should not
automatically preclude one from recovery. The determinative factor should be
whether such a plaintiff possesses equal bargaining power with the defendant.
If the positions of the parties are relatively equal, then it may be fair to re-
quire the plaintiff to sue under a warranty theory. However, if the defendant is
in a superior bargaining position, it is unfair to limit the weaker party to con-
tract principles of recovery.
The manufacturer is the father of the transaction. Moreover, the manu-
facturer produces the defective product. In light of the consumer's inferior
bargaining position, the manufacturer is the one who can best spread the
losses. Extending liability to the manufacturer under these circumstances does
not create or impose an undue burden upon him. In many cases, economic
damages are not as extensive as personal injury damages.149 "Even where eco-
nomic loss is large and uninsured, it usually will not involve the kind of sec-
ondary costs such as those resulting from inability to rehabilitate, that may be
caused by personal injury." 50 Finally, the injured consumer who suffers any
kind of loss as a result of a defect in the product typically cannot prevent the
loss. The defect itself is normally undiscovered until the loss occurs. Thus,
losses sustained due to product defects should rightfully be borne by the
manufacturer.
KIMBERLY JADE TILLMAN
146. Gibson v. Reliable Chevrolet, 608 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981).
147. City of Clayton v. Grumman Emergency Prod., 576 F. Supp. 1122, 1126
(E.D. Mo. 1983).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 126-28.
149. Ribstein, Guidelines for Deciding Product Economic Loss Cases, 29 MER-
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